China’s ascent in global governance and the Arctic by Fengshi, Wu
118
Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 6. 2016. Вып. 2
   DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu06.2016.211
UDC 327
Fengshi Wu
CHINA’S ASCENT IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ARCTIC
Th e paper explains the tendencies of China’s Arctic policy by locating them in general patterns of 
China’s uneven rise in global governance across many subject areas. Among the four major pathways 
of China’s enhanced participation in global governance, the Arctic case is best explained by the ‘push 
in’ pathway, where a signifi cant increase of lobbying and activities of engagement can be found. Th e 
paper highlights that the Arctic is an issue area where China will experiment with new tactics to exert 
infl uence on the reform of existing multilateral institutions and to promote its own normative princi-
ples for global governance. Refs 33. Table 1.
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Introduction
China has transformed from a remotely relevant party to an active permanent 
observer of the Arctic Council in less than a decade’s time. Many researchers have correctly 
pointed out that China’s increasingly evident ambitions targeting the Arctic are primarily 
driven by its economic pursuits related to energy, fi shing and shipping [1–6]. Th is paper, 
however, takes a diff erent conceptual angle and locates China-Arctic relations in the overall 
development of China’s engagement with global governance since the new millennium. 
Th e purpose of this research is not to speculate on the immediate incentives or outcomes, 
but to search for the general tendency of China’s stance on Arctic governance. Th e main 
logic is that, besides contingent negotiations and power structures of the international 
system, China-Arctic relations are also shaped by a momentum of their own, which is 
embedded in the rise of China in global governance at large. 
Th e paper consists of three substantive parts. Th e fi rst part reviews China’s uneven 
participation in international institutions across issue areas. Although China’s integration 
into the global market system and international fi nancial institutions has been smooth, 
it is still excluded in many other strategic areas of global governance such as energy. Th e 
next part explains four diff erent pathways of change in China’s behavior with regard to 
various international governing institutions, and argues that China-Arctic relations will 
follow the fourth pathway which predicts China will push into the existing governing 
structures with active advocacy, lobbying and outside activities. Th e third part outlines the 
three-fold implication of the ‘push in’ strategy for Arctic governance, and explicates the 
specifi c tactics China has applied to enhance its political presence in the Arctic. Th e paper 
concludes that the Arctic case demonstrates China’s willingness and ability to break down 
barriers and to elevate its participation in international institutions and global governance. 
China and international institutions
Traditionally, China is neither enthusiastic in building international organizations, 
nor particularly in favor of multilateralism in international cooperation. For example, 
China’s contribution to United Nations institutions (both monetary and personnel) had 
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been the least impressive among all ‘middle range powers’ in world politics including In-
dia, Japan, Germany and Brazil up until the 2010s [7]. However, since Xi Jinping took 
offi  ce in 2012, China has presented the world with a series of spectacular initiatives for 
multilateral cooperation such as the Silk Road Fund, the Free Trade Area of Asia Pacifi c 
Framework, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the One-Belt-One-
Road initiative1. It is reasonable to argue that there has been a mentality shift  from ‘hiding 
brightness’ (taoguan yanghiu) to ‘striving with vigor’ (fenfa youwei) and ‘great renaissance’ 
(weida fuxing) among the top decision makers in China, who have gradually digested the 
reality that Chinese domestic and diplomatic actions are ‘major determinants’ of any suc-
cess in global governance building [8].
1 Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Economic Belt plan during his state visit 
to Kazakhstan in September 2013. A month later, Xi proposed the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in 
his address to the Indonesian parliament. Later, the Chinese government combined these two regional 
proposals of international development cooperation, and named it One Belt One Road initiative.
China’s participation in global governance: Four types of status and pathways of change
Issues Governing institutions
China’s participation
Current status Pathway of change
Energy
Fossil fuel Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC)
Non-member Push in
Gas Exporting Countries Forum
Organization for Economic Development 
and Cooperation 
International Energy Agency
Civil nuclear Nuclear Energy Agency Non-member Push in








Forestry U.N. Forestry Forum Member Leadership
Other global public aff airs






Aerosphere U.N. Framework for Climate Change 
Convention
Member Leadership
Nuclear security U.N. Conference on Disarmament Member, under 
criticism
Resist criticism
Trade World Trade Organization Member Leadership
Finance International Monetary Fund Member Leadership
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Despite the top-down political stimulus, China faces many obstacles in enhancing its 
status in global governance. To begin with, China’s participation in major international 
institutions is incomplete and highly uneven, measured by both membership and the 
level of international criticism (Table 1). Relatively speaking, since the 2000s China has 
been an active member of international trade, fi nance and development institutions, and 
a moderate complier of major international environmental treaties. Yet it also has been a 
reluctant member, a bystander, or even a staunch resistor to a few international régimes 
with regard to nuclear nonproliferation, human rights and transboundary water resource 
management, and as such faces high levels of international criticism and scrutiny. 
In a sense, the case of World Trade Organization accession is the sweet spot, not the 
main pattern, of China’s participation in global governance. For example, in contrast to 
common knowledge, China is absent from all major international governing institutions 
related to energy, though it has become the world’s second largest consumer and biggest im-
porter of fossil fuel in recent years [9–11]. Not a net exporter of these resources (therefore, 
not a member of OPEC), China will thus be unable to have a direct impact on international 
negotiations over oil and gas prices, so long as it is excluded from the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency 
(IEA)2. Th e only major exception here is China’s formal participation in the UN based 
International Energy Forum (IEF) — a much broader and general mechanism to facilitate 
communications among all member states related to world energy markets. Yet, China’s 
IEF status was only recently changed from ‘dialogue partner’ to ‘full member’, which again 
indicates the nascent beginning of its inclusion in global governance of energy. 
Four pathways of change
Due to its incomplete inclusion, variant membership status and uneven participa-
tion, China has acted diff erently with regard to various international regimes since the 
2000s, though with the same goal of enhancing its presence and impact. As China intends 
to transform from a regular to a more signifi cant player in global governance, there have 
emerged four pathways of change in its behavior. Th e fi rst pathway highlights a sharp 
ascent of China’s presence in an issue area where it has been relatively a good complier of 
the existing governing regime and principles (such as trade, fi nance and development). 
Marked by assertive actions to protect its own interests, active advocacy for reform and 
increasing pursuit of institutional leadership, China’s status has risen signifi cantly within 
the governing structures of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the Asian 
Development Bank. Along this path, China has also employed the method of launching 
an alternative multilateral institution to enjoy a type of decision-making power exclusive 
to a ‘founding member’ that had never before been available to her. Th e above mentioned 
AIIB is an exact case in point here. 
Th e second pathway of China’s rise in global governance starts with the scenario 
where China has already signed an international treaty yet remains resistant to the pre-
scribed norms, principles and commitments. Unlike the fi rst pathway, this one will only 
witnesses unremarkable or even an absence of change in China’s behavior. Despite being a 
signatory to all U.N. human rights related conventions, China will not comprise its stance, 
2 Th e OECD has invited China to be a partner state recently, and at least four Chinese staff  now work 
at the IEA headquarters in Paris to coordinate China’s interests with international oil price negotiations. 
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fully accept all the criticism, or reform domestic policies to meet the standards set by these 
treaties. Instead, China will continue to bypass, ‘pay lip service’ and maneuver in inter-
national negotiations and human rights governance as evidenced by its behavior at the 
U. N. Human Right Council since 2006 [12]. In addition, when China deems necessary, it 
will refuse to sign new treaties in this fi eld such as the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court [13]. 
Similar to the second, the third pathway also implies little change in China’s inter-
national behavior in the areas where it is offi  cially a bystander — a voluntary absentee —
of global top-down governance. If China was able to endure all the cost and pressure of not 
accepting certain international norms or practices before, it probably could do so even more 
from now on. For example, the U. N. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbound-
ary Watercourse and International Lakes (a.k.a. the U. N. Water Convention) was opened 
for signature in 1997 and won broad support among U. N. members. However, China and 
several upstream countries including Turkey decided to not to take part in it. Th is Conven-
tion went into eff ect on 17 August 2014, and there is no sign of China becoming a signatory 
soon, which in a way discourages the countries in South Asia (and other countries that have 
disputes with China over shared water resources) to rectify it on time [14].
Th e fourth pathway, including cases where China is still excluded by global govern-
ing institution in a specifi c issue area, will see many major changes in China’s activity. 
Along this pathway, China is expected to make signifi cant eff orts to ‘push in’. Although 
the number of such cases is not great, some of them are of strategic importance such as oil 
and gas. Both OECD and IEA have been lobbied by various Chinese agencies to reform 
the membership requirements so as to allow China to join in or play a bigger part [15]. 
Moreover, China has experimented with diff erent venues to improve its options outside of 
the formal governing structures (made up by OPEC, OECD and IEA) such as strengthen-
ing bilateral energy relations with individual fuel export countries [16]. As China tries to 
change its non-member status in some areas of global governance, it will run into intense 
negotiations with the existing key stake-holders. However, in distinction from the fi rst 
pathway where China has already been included in the international regime of a specifi c 
issue (such as the WTO in trade), China will hardly break away from the existing frame-
work of global governance or build up an alternative framework (such as the AIIB in the 
fi eld of international development) along the fourth pathway. Th e reason for this lies not 
only in the high cost of building a new institution and attracting membership, but the fact 
that the People’s Republic lacks experience in participating in the management of global 
policies in a specifi c fi eld: China is not prepared to off er the world a convincing alternative 
plan. For example, its very preliminary eff ort to build up its own network countering the 
existing global governance over the internet such as hosting the World Internet Confer-
ence has met with limited, if not rare, response. State heads from only eight countries at-
tended this conference in Zhejiang province, eastern China, on 16 December 2015.
China’s ‘push in’ strategy and the Arctic
Because of the existing governing structures of the Arctic and the set-up of the Arc-
tic Council, China, like any other country, is left  with no alternative option but to elbow 
in if it wants to be seriously involved in Arctic aff airs [17]. Th e case of the China-Arctic 
relationship fi ts in the above fourth pathway analogy at the moment. Th e implication is 
122      Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 6. Политология. Международные отношения. 2016. Вып. 2
three-folded: Firstly, China will try its best to push its way into the game and to become 
a part of the decision-making processes, even without a full membership. Th is point is 
mostly demonstrated by its successful attainment of the permanent observer status of the 
Arctic Council in 2014 [18].
Secondly, as a full membership of the Arctic Council is not possible in the foreseeable 
future, China will pursue alternative strategies to optimize its outside standing, particu-
larly through bilateral and business channels. In recent years, China has made the Arctic 
among the top priorities in its bilateral relations with all of the Nordic countries and suc-
cessfully negotiated a bilateral Arctic initiative with Iceland [19, 3]. Aft er the conservative 
political force took power in Norway in 2013, the bilateral relationship between China and 
Norway gradually picked up momentum aft er a dip as the result of the 2011 Nobel Peace 
Prize. Recent reports show growing interest from the Norwegian side to accept Chinese 
state oil company and let China invest in its own eastern Barents Sea, and even possibly 
other Arctic areas [20]. In addition, given the history and the ongoing attempt to form a 
Sino-U.S. bilateral framework of carbon emission reduction, it is not far-fetched to project 
that China and the U.S. would negotiate a mutual agreement related to Arctic aff airs inde-
pendent from the Arctic Council [21].
In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, followed by Western sanctions and declining 
global oil prices, Russia and China have come closer as strategic partners at the global 
level, and the Arctic has gradually emerged, among many others, as an area for potential 
long-term cooperation. As Russia is a major power in international negotiations related to 
the Arctic, its willingness to cooperate with China in specifi c sectors such as sea naviga-
tion and energy exploration could open unprecedented opportunity for China to enhance 
its presence and outreach in the Arctic region. Th e 20th Regular Meeting of China-Russia 
Prime Ministers took place in Beijing on 17 December 2015, and, for the fi rst time, bilater-
al cooperation between the two countries in Arctic sea route and navigation was included 
the Joint Declaration based on the meeting [22]. To many keen observers, such joint docu-
ments and collaboration could mark signifi cant advancement of China’s participation in 
Arctic aff airs [23, 24].
Besides directly engaging the Arctic Council member countries via normal diplomat-
ic channels, the Chinese government has been keen in supporting Chinese state owned 
fossil fuel companies to expand their economic networks in Arctic regions, particularly 
through Russian territories. For example, Rosneft  and its Chinese counterparts are inter-
ested in developing natural gas projects in both the Barents Sea and the Pechora Sea, and 
establishing joint ventures. China is also reported to control 20 percent stake in Novatek’s 
Yamal liquifi ed natural gas (LNG) project, and take part in the development of Novatek’s 
Arctic LNG 1, Arctic LNG 2 and Arctic LNG 3 projects in the Gydan Peninsula [25].
Lastly, with both accumulated experiences in world aff airs and enhanced state capac-
ity, China could employ innovative methods to carve out a niche to aff ect the Arctic gover-
nance in a way that would at least reduce impediments to its own interests. In this aspect, 
the most impressive feature in China’s eff orts in Arctic governance is its rhetorical skill 
and savvy utilization of international legal languages. As Oran Young accurately pointed 
out, Arctic governance entered a ‘new era’ of governance during the 2000s, turning from 
‘a distinctive region with a policy agenda of its own’ to a region with ‘tightened’ connec-
tions to the broader planetary system and therefore non-Arctic countries [26]. At this 
critical juncture in the political history of the Arctic, it is China more than any other rising 
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power which has most vocally advocated that the Arctic needs to be discussed in broader 
legal frameworks. ‘Chinese perspectives [on Arctic aff airs] draw a distinction between 
purely Arctic issues and Arctic issues of interest to the broader international community 
and express a strong interest in playing a role in addressing the broader issues’ [26, p. 167]. 
Many can treat this type of Chinese rhetoric as merely a cover for its mercantilist pursuits, 
but such a perspective is not at odds with the progressive trends in global governance, 
highlighting participation, equity, transparency and other principles. In a way, China’s 
Arctic rhetoric has a potential to be used by any other non-Arctic countries, or even inter-
national agencies, that do not have an existing presence in Arctic governance. 
In addition, despite all the ironies and controversies, China has eff ectively utilized 
the language of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLS), particularly the sec-
tions related to navigation, in its handling of Arctic aff airs. In his public speech given on 
the U.N. Day of 2014 (later published in the Chinese Journal of International Law), Wang 
Yi, current Chinese Foreign Minister, referred to China’s stance on Arctic governance as 
an example of how China ‘defends the rule of law in international politics’ [27]. At the 
opening session of the 3rd Arctic Circle Assembly held on 16 October 2015, in Reykjavik, 
Iceland, Wang gave a video message and again explicitly stated that ‘the rights of non-
Arctic countries under international law in the Arctic and the collective interests of the 
international community should be respected’ [28]. Th us, China’s using of the languages 
of the UNCLS is not tied only to its own claims but in the name of the whole international 
community. 
Moreover, Chinese scholars and policy experts have constructed a concept, ‘near-
Arctic (jin beiji) states’, to advocate for the legitimacy of China’s involvement in Arctic 
aff airs, which can be viewed as a direct response to the terms such as ‘Arctic coastal states’, 
‘Arctic bordering states’ and ‘Arctic states’ used by the Arctic Five and/or the Arctic Coun-
cil respectively. Th is term ‘near-Arctic’ has already been widely used in the Chinese media, 
academic writings and even (semi-)offi  cial speeches such as Op-Ed pieces published in 
the People’s Daily — the central offi  cial media outlet3. When the Chinese Vice Foreign 
Minister gave his keynote speech in Reykjavik recently, he defi ned China as a ‘near-Arctic’ 
country and stated that ‘ecological changes and resource development in the Arctic have a 
direct impact on China’s climate, environment, agriculture, shipping, trade and socio-eco-
nomic development’4. According to Chinese Arctic experts who have regular exchanges 
with their counterparts in other countries, this term could be potentially appealing to 
other countries such as Korea, Japan, Kazakhstan and even Britain when they also see the 
need to get more involved in Arctic aff airs5.
China’s potential in utilizing rhetorical tools and mobilizing for normative support 
in its Arctic agenda should not be under-estimated. Ever since the Mao Zhedong-Zhou 
3 As China so far has not published an offi  cial Arctic white paper, the Op-Ed that appeared in the 
People’s Daily [29] has been viewed by most Chinese experts as a semi-offi  cial Arctic policy document. 
Much of the points included in this upbeat article is based on the logic that China is in fact a ‘near Arctic’ 
and relevant party to the future of the Arctic region and the Northern shipping route. Th e author thanks 
Professor Guo Peiqing for pointing out the relevance of the Op-Ed piece.
4 See [30] for the original Chinese speech. In the offi  cial abbreviated English translation of the speech, 
the term ‘near-Arctic’ was removed, see [31].
5 Th is follows the author’s observations gathered at the China-Canada Arctic Forum held in Shanghai 
(15/11/2014) and the 4th International Workshop on Arctic Policy in the XXI Century held in St. Petersburg 
(24/04/2015). 
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Enlai era, China’s diplomacy has not been short of distinctive idioms, doctrines and pro-
posals of fundamental principles in world politics, such as ‘seeking common ground while 
reserving diff erences (qiutong chunyi, heping gongchun)’ and ‘peaceful co-existence (hepi 
gongchu)’. Among others, the case of China’s advocacy for the principle of Common But 
Diff erentiated Responsibility (CBDR) merits particular attention, as it illustrates China’s 
ability in generating norms in global governance. While this principle has already been 
widely adopted in global climate negotiations, little is known to the general public that 
China has played a critical role in the formation and operationalization of it from the very 
beginning. During the last session of the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, China, led by its legendary Premier Zhou Enlai at the time, proposed ten points for 
further discussion and called for a new working group to draft  the fi nal Conference Dec-
laration. Th e core of these ten points was to draw a clear line between the capability and 
responsibility of developed and developing countries. As a result, two entirely new prin-
ciples were added to the Stockholm Declaration: underlining the need to balance develop-
ment with environmental protection, and every country’s right to decide its own environ-
mental standards [32]. Th is is the beginning of the emergence of the CBDR principle. In 
the following three decades, China, oft en joined by India and other leading developing 
countries, has pushed for continuous attention to and formal adoption of this principle in 
international negotiations [33]. In more and more cases of regional and multilateral rela-
tions where China plays a leading role, Chinese leaders bring up the CBDR principle, such 
as the meetings of the World Trade Organization and among the BASIC countries (Brazil, 
India, South Africa and China) in recent years. 
In a way, ‘(b)y faming its opposition to binding commitments in the language of 
CBDR, China uses rhetoric that resonates deeply with the views and shared identity of the 
developing world’ [29, p. 4]. Th irteen years aft er the launching of a ‘global war on terror’, 
American hegemony is declining not merely in military or economic terms, but, probably 
more importantly, in its global appeal and normative leadership. Failing to break through 
the stalemate at the negotiation tables for global public good, the American government is 
losing its normative power in global governance. Against this background, China’s advo-
cacy of the kinds of norms that read very diff erently from what have made up the existing 
global governance may be of more than trivial importance. 
Conclusion
In the context of China’s partial participation in global governance, president Xi has 
launched an ambitious plan to create more political space for China to play a bigger role in 
multilateral and global institutions. And the Arctic is an issue area where China has been 
actively experimenting with various tactics to overcome structural obstacles, to advance 
its position in an existing multilateral institution, and to make the best out of its outside 
position by engaging member states bilaterally.
Th e paper also highlights that the Arctic appears to be one of the global governance 
areas where China is keen in promoting not merely its presence but also its normative 
principle for the international society. Th e Chinese narrative on the Arctic has been fi rmly 
anchored in international laws of seas and explicit about the common entitlement to the 
potential resource and navigation routes in the region. Th is position refl ects the Chinese 
government’s stance on the right to develop and equity in sharing natural resources on the 
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planet. Th is overall orientation will not shift  in the short run. A domestic environmental 
movement is on the rise, but not strong enough to persuade the Chinese leadership 
to take up the conservationist approach in Arctic aff airs. Within the Arctic Council, 
negotiations are sometimes clouded by security concerns, particularly for Russia and the 
U. S. Th erefore, the possibility for an Antarctic-like move for the Arctic and for a more 
broad governing structure to emerge is still slim. Given the political realities in the Arctic 
region, the Chinese narrative of development and equity may be in fact appealing to non-
Arctic bordering countries and prove ripe for the mobilization of reform in the future. 
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